In this paper, by expanding the definition of dominance, we present the new concepts of weak core and weak stable set for fuzzy cooperative game, and study the properties of them.
Introduction
Since J.V. Neumann and O. Morgenstern introduced cooperative game in 1944 (Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) , cooperative game has received a generous concern from scholars and become a research focus in academia. Half a century has witnessed the formation of the mature theory of cooperative game. As an emerging branch of game theory, fuzzy game theory started with work of Aubin in 1974 (Aubin, 1974 , where special attention is paid to the core concept. The purpose of this paper is to give the new notion of weak dominance and weak stable set for fuzzy cooperative game, and discuss the properties of them.
Basic definitions
Give a finite set [ ]
The core of a fuzzy game v is the subset of imputations which are stable against any possible deviation by fuzzy coalitions (Tijs, Branzei & Ishihara, (285) (286) (287) (288) (289) (290) (291) (292) (293) (294) (295) (296) 
Now we give the new definitions.
Definition 1. Let v be a fuzzy game, , ( )
( ) 
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. This is a contradiction. Hence
Proof: If for all
. Otherwise there exist a coalition x y f . This is contradict with the internal property of K .
